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Does human capital endowment of FDI recipient countries really matter? 
Evidence from cross-country firm level data 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
The stylized literature on foreign direct investment suggests that developing countries should invest in 
the human capital of their labour force in order to attract foreign direct investment. However, if 
educational quality in developing country is uncertain such that formal education is a noisy signal of 
human capital, it might be rational for multinational enterprises to focus more on job-specific training 
than on formal education of the labour force. Using cross-country data from the textiles and garments 
industry, we demonstrate that training indeed has greater impact on firm efficiency in developing 
countries than formal education of the work force. 
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1. Introduction 
It is now stylised in the literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) that a country’s stock of human 
capital is one of the most important determinants of its inward FDI flow (Noorbakhsh et al. 2001). A 
related literature suggests that FDI inflow can, in turn, augment a recipient country’s human resources 
(Enderwick, 1985; UNCTAD, 1999). It motivates the local work force to invest in education, and, at 
the same time, transfers knowledge about technology and processes to a section of this work force. 
However, available evidence suggests that the impact of training programmes of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) on the human capital development of the local labour force may have been 
overstated. Arguably, MNEs provide firm-specific training that increases the efficiency of their work 
force, without necessarily significantly deepening the knowledge base of the local workers, nor 
developing scarce skills such as managerial capabilities (Richman and Copen, 1972; UNCTAD, 
1999). 
 A very different literature suggests that aggregate measures such as enrolment, drop-out rates 
and proportion of labour force with a certain level of education might not capture (indeed, overstate) 
the stock of human capital in a developing country. The range of problems with the quality of 
education, which is difficult to measure, includes absence of physical infrastructure such as 
classrooms and text books (World Bank, 1997), shortened school hours on account of over-enrolment 
(Glewwe, 2004), low educational attainment of teachers (Harbison and Hanushek, 1992), and 
absenteeism among teachers (Chaudhury et al., 2006). The policy debate also reflects issues such as 
apprehension about suitability of content of academic programmes for sustenance of economic 
activity. In other words, the stock of human capital is a noisy signal of labour force quality in 
developing countries. 
 This, in turn, has two implications. First, it suggests that MNEs investing in developing 
countries (or, broadly speaking, in countries with inadequate educational quality) should not rely on 
the perceived quality of the local labour force and be prepared to use targeted training to improve 
efficiency of their subsidiaries. Second, it suggests that developing countries aiming to attract FDI 
should perhaps not worry about progressively deepening the educational attainment of their labour 
force, and concentrate instead on ensuring that a large proportion of the labour force has some 
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minimum level of education that can then be the base on which MNEs can build using targeted (or 
firm-specific) training programmes. While this combination of MNE and host country strategies may 
not be applicable for high-technology industries, it could be a mutually acceptable equilibrium for a 
wide range of low-technology industries in which most developing countries (especially low income 
countries) can reasonably expect FDI. 
 In this paper, using cross-country firm-level data from the textiles and garments industry, 
which is ubiquitous across developing countries and one in which developing countries arguably have 
comparative advantage, we examine two hypotheses, namely, that education level of the local 
workforce does not improve production efficiency of firms, and that MNE training significantly 
improves efficiency (or reduces inefficiency). Our results are consistent with these hypotheses. Using 
data on MNEs across a cross-section of industries, we also demonstrate that educational level of 
workers has the desired impact on efficiency of these firms, suggesting that, in keeping with popular 
perceptions, MNEs are perhaps able to cherry pick high quality labourers. While the data are fraught 
with problems, thereby limiting the methodological scope of our research, our results provides prima 
facie evidence about the importance of perceived human capital (or formal education) of workers in 
FDI recipient countries that have significant relevance for both MNE strategy in developing countries, 
and the education policies of developing country governments. 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the stochastic frontier 
methodology that is used for the empirical analysis in the paper. The data and specification are 
discussed in Section 3, and the regression results in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical strategy 
It is well understood that the main sources of productivity growth at the firm level are technical 
progress and efficiency gains. In traditional industries such as textiles where there has been little 
change in technology in the recent past, and where the shift to power looms took place decades ago 
even in developing countries (Bhaumik, Gangopadhyay and Krishnan, 2008), productivity growth is 
driven largely by changes in efficiency (Margono and Sharma, 2006). Efficiency, in turn, is affected 
by an increase in the human capital endowment of workers: ceteris paribus, more can be produced 
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with the same number of workers, or the same amount can be produced using fewer workers. Hence, 
in the context of our analysis, a key issue is how formal education of the workforce and training 
offered by the companies that employ them affect firm level efficiency. Our hypothesis is that 
efficiency will be increased by training, and will be unaffected by the formal education levels of the 
work force. 
 The impact of firm characteristics such as formal education of workers and training on 
efficiency can be examined using stochastic frontier models. The neo-classical production theory 
implicitly assumes that all production activities are on the frontier (defined either as the maximum 
possible output that is technically attainable given inputs (output-oriented measure), or that the 
observed output level can be produced using lesser inputs (input-oriented measure) of the feasible 
production set (subject to random errors). The production efficiency literature, however, relaxes the 
assumption, and considers the possibility that producers may operate below the frontier due to 
technical inefficiency (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). A production plan is technically inefficient 
(output-oriented) if actual output produced is less than the frontier output (subject to random errors). 
Alternatively, if inputs actually used is more than the minimum required to produce a given level of 
output the production plan is said to be technically inefficient (input-oriented).  
Mathematically, a production plan with input-oriented (IO) technical inefficiency is written as 
( exp( )), 0y f x              (1) 
where   measures IO technical inefficiency (TI), and exp(- ) measures IO technical efficiency (TE). 
For small  , exp(- ) can be approximated by 1 - . Thus, we get the following familiar relationship, 
TE = 1 - TI. A mathematical formulation of output-oriented (OO) technical inefficiency is 
( )exp( ), 0y f x u u            (2) 
where u measures OO technical inefficiency. Again for small u we can approximate exp(-u) by 1-u, 
which gives us the familiar result, TE = exp(-u) = 1 - u = 1 - TI. 
Since inefficiency can be viewed either in the input or output direction, we get the following 
relationship between the two measures, viz., ( )exp( )f x u  = ( .exp( ))f x  . If the production 
function is homogeneous of degree k then .k u  , i.e, OO inefficiency is a constant multiple of IO 
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inefficiency. In the special case when return to scale is unity, both inefficiency measures are the same. 
If return to scale is neither constant nor unity, the relationship is more complicated (although exact 
and is given by ( )exp( )f x u  = ( .exp( ))f x  ) and it depends on the input quantities.  
 Earlier empirical studies on determinants of firm efficiency typically used stochastic frontier 
models to estimate firm-level efficiency, and then followed it up with an ordinary least square 
regression model in which efficiency was regressed on firm-level and contextual variables. However, 
as argued by Kumbhakar et al. (1991), estimates generated by this two-stage methodology are 
inefficient because the assumption of independence of the inefficiency effects in the two stages is 
typically violated. They propose an alternative approach in which u is explicitly modelled as a vector 
of explanatory variables and a random error. Battese and Coelli (1995) propose a model that is an 
equivalent of the Kumbhakar et al. (1991) specification: 
          (3) 
 Zm            (4) 
where X is a vector of variables that determine output and Z is a vector of variables that influence the 
efficiency of a firm. The two equations are estimated simultaneously, thereby eliminating the 
aforementioned inefficiency problem. Note that in case of a production function m would measure 
inefficiency whereas in case of a cost function it would measure efficiency. 
 In our paper, we adopt the Battese and Coelli (1995) approach to modelling output and 
efficiency. We model output as a function of material inputs, labour and capital, and simultaneously 
model firm level inefficiency as a function of human capital of the work force, training, and indicators 
of labour market institutions. If formal education of workers in developing countries is indeed a noisy 
signal of human capital, then we should find that training reduces firm level inefficiency much more 
than formal measures of human capital of workers (such as years of education). In the limit, only 
training should have a significant (and negative) impact on firm level inefficiency. 
 
2.1 Endogeneity of training 
)( uvXy  
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It has been argued in the literature on training that it is endogenous to firm characteristics (Blundell, 
Dearden and Meghir, 1996). At the individual level, endogeneity might arise from the fact that 
individual labourers are not randomly chosen for training, but that this decision is based on 
unobserved characteristics of these labourers. At the aggregate (or firm) level, it might arise from the 
fact that training is either related to overall characteristics of labourers, such as their skill level, or to 
outcomes such as firm performance. In particular, firms are more likely to introduce human resource 
practices such as training when they are in trouble or when their productivity is below industry 
average (Bartel, 1994; Black and Lynch, 2001). Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000) argue that 
ignoring this endogeneity leads to an underestimation of the impact of training. 
 Where panel data are available, researchers have attempted to correct for this endogeneity 
using the GMM estimator. However, the use of the GMM estimator does not necessarily alter the 
economic implications of the results in a significant way. For example, in Dearden, Reed and Van 
Reenen (2006), the coefficient estimate for the impact of training on log value added per worker is 
0.70-0.78 when the random effects estimator is used, and the coefficient estimate is 0.60 when GMM 
is used. At the same time, as discussed by Zwick (2006), past values of training might be weak 
instruments of current decisions about training (and its intensity), with attendant implications for 
GMM estimation, and an alternative is the use of stylized instrumental variable (IV) estimation 
whereby the incidence (or intensity) of training is regressed on a set of determinants that includes 
some instruments, and then the predicted value of the likelihood (or intensity) is used in the second 
stage regression that estimates the impact of training on, among others, productivity. 
 In the context of our paper, given the cross-section nature of the data, the use of the GMM 
estimator, irrespective of its advantages and disadvantages, is infeasible. If we have to correct for 
potential endogeneity of the training variable, we therefore have to adopt the IV approach. However, 
this, in turn, leads to the well understood problem about the trade off between the unbiasedness and 
inefficiency of IV estimators. Since good (and strongly exogenous) instruments are not easily found in 
academic work, a rule of thumb involves the use of the mean squared error (MSE) criterion to trade 
off between unbiasedness and inefficiency. The MSE criterion suggests that use of the IV estimator 
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may not always be desirable (Bartels, 1991), and it is indeed sometimes abandoned in favour of 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and other non-IV estimators (e.g., Bhaumik and Nugent, 1999).  
 We estimated a probit model in which the dependent variable is training (which, as we shall 
see later, is a dummy variable). The explanatory variables included change in assets, change in 
average education of the labour force, change in value added and exports as a share of total sales,
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which are consistent with the argument that HR practices like training are introduced as a reaction to 
changes in a firm's performance or as a reaction to a problem with the quality of its resources. The 
regression estimates, not reported in the paper, suggest that while some of the explanatory variables 
have meaningful coefficient estimates -- training is less likely in companies that experience growth in 
assets and in those for which exports account for a high proportion of sales, the IV regression overall 
is very weak, with pseudo R-square values of less than 0.05. This, in turn, suggests that the use of the 
IV approach in our case would result in significant loss of efficiency, and indeed would not be 
meaningful, given the weakness of the IV regression model. We, therefore, do not instrument the 
incidence of training in the rest of the paper. 
 
3. Data and specification 
3.1 Data 
Our main data source is the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, which contain firm level data from 
approximately 100 less developed and transition economies. Aside from containing the usual for such 
type of data set balance sheet and financial statements information, which allow us to estimate 
production function for a number of different sectors, the dataset also contains information on various 
workers characteristics, such as the proportion of the workforce in different education categories, as 
well as information on whether this workforce has received any training by the firm for which it 
works. We also have information on both foreign ownership and the access to foreign technology. We 
complement this data with measures of institutional characteristics of labour market from the Botero 
et al. (2004) dataset.  
                                                          
1
 The data includes information about the 1-period past values of assets, educational level of labourers, and 
value added. Hence, we were able to compute these changes. 
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 The main disadvantage of our dataset is that missing data significantly limits number of 
observation for individual industrial sectors. The number of observations is especially limited for 
firms that are predominantly foreign owned. Missing values have affected our analysis in two ways. 
First, after accounting for missing values for key variables such as capital and materials, only the 
textile and garments sector has adequate number of observations to estimate our production and 
inefficiency equations.
2
 Second, in some cases, we were required to use dummy variables instead of 
continuous variables; e.g., a large number of missing values for the variables that measures the 
proportion of employees who have received training, we have had to use a cruder measure of training 
involving the use of a dummy variable. 
 As we shall see later in the paper, while this restricts the scope of our empirical analysis, it 
nevertheless yields interesting observations that have significant implications for human resource 
(training) strategies of MNEs, education policies of developing countries seeking to attract FDI, and 
the ease with which training provided by MNE subsidiaries to their work force can have spillover 
effects. 
 
3.2 Specification 
To begin with, we consider the stylised Cobb-Douglas production function 
                    (5) 
where Y is total sales, M is the dollar value of “materials” (i.e., non-labour and non-capital inputs), L 
is the dollar value of labour inputs, K is the capital stock, and A is a measure of  technology which, in 
our case, is a dummy variable that takes the value one if a firm has access to foreign technology. The 
Cobb-Douglas production function yields the familiar log-linear production function. We later use the 
more general translog functional form for the production function. We model firm level inefficiency 
as a function of the following (sets of) variables: 
Educational attainment of the labour force. The data provides information on proportion of 
the work force that have fewer than 6 years of education, between 6 and 9 years of education, between 
                                                          
2
 As indicated at the outset, restricting our analysis to the textile and garments sector is conceptually not a major 
problem, given that this is a key sector in developing/emerging economies. 
10 
 
9 and 12 years of education, and more than 12 years of education. However, information about the 
two middle categories is largely missing, and hence unusable. Further, while it is reasonable to 
assume that firm level inefficiency increases with the proportion of workers with fewer than 6 years 
of education and decreases with the proportion of workers with more than 12 years of education, it is 
difficult to form a priori expectations about the impact of the middle education categories on 
inefficiency. Hence, in our specification, we include the proportion of the work force with the lowest 
and highest recorded levels of education. 
Non-technological aspects of foreign ownership. The stylised literature on MNEs suggests 
that these firms have innate capabilities that are a key driver of their overseas investment decisions, 
and the popular wisdom is that these innate capabilities are generally superior technologies or 
production processes. In our stochastic frontier formulation, this aspect of MNEs is included in the 
production function, such that any indicator of the multinationality of the firm – a dummy variable in 
our case – captures non-technical aspects of foreign ownership. Specifically, it can capture the so-
called liability of foreignness (for details about the literature, see Miller and Parkhe, 2001), one aspect 
of which is the difficulty experienced by foreign owners as they grapple with very different 
organisational cultures in overseas locations (Brouthers et al., 2003). 
Training. We distinguish between the training provided by MNEs and local firms by 
including in the inefficiency equation an indicator of training – a dummy variable in our case, both on 
its own and in interaction with the dummy variable that indicates foreign ownership. 
Local labour market institutions. Since labour market institutions such as flexibility with 
respect to hire and fire may affect allocational efficiency and x-efficiency of firms, we include in the 
specification the indices of labour market institutions reported by Botero et al. (2004). While the years 
of survey for individual countries vary between 2002 and 2006, we make the reasonable assumption 
that labour market institutions in countries do not change rapidly, such that the Botero et al. indices 
capture the nature of labour market institutions in these countries to a reasonable extent. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
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In Table 1, we report the estimates for the Cobb-Douglas production function and the inefficiency 
equation. We start with an estimation of the production function itself (column 1), and gradually add 
explanatory variables to the inefficiency equation (columns 2-5). In Table 3, we report the coefficient 
estimates of the inefficiency equation alone, for the more general translog production function; 
columns 2a-5a in Table 2 correspond to columns 2-5 of Table 1. Table 2, therefore, provides a 
robustness check for Table 1., and since the results reported in Table 3 are indeed consistent with 
those in Table 2 we discuss only the results discussed in Table 2. 
 The coefficient estimates of the production function reported in Table 1 suggest that the 
textiles and garments industry enjoy increasing returns to scale, albeit marginally. The coefficient of 
the foreign technology dummy is significant for the jointly estimated production-inefficiency model 
(columns 2-5), strongly for the (nearly) fully specified models in columns 4 and 5. The coefficient of 
the technology variable (0.25) too is comparable to those of the factor inputs. Hence, even for a 
relatively low technology industry such as textiles and garments, technology can have a significant 
and economically meaningful impact on output. Note, however, that our measure of foreign 
technology merely indicates that a firm has access to this technology, and does not limit the access to 
foreign technology only to MNE subsidiaries. In other words, the same outcome can be generated if 
domestic firms in the host countries can procure foreign technology through purchase of state of the 
art capital equipment, technology licensing, etc. 
 The coefficient estimates of the inefficiency equation suggest the following: 
 Number of years of schooling may not capture the quality of education and skill of the 
labour force in developing countries. Note that the inefficiency level increases with the 
proportion of the work force with more than 12 years of education. This could, of course, 
imply that many of these workers are not involved in productive activities, e.g., there 
could be administrative and managerial staff who do not add significantly to the 
production process. However, while the data do not permit us to examine this more 
closely, our counterintuitive result is certainly consistent with the literature on the 
problems associated with the measurement of quality of education and skill of the labour 
force in developing countries. 
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 Foreign owned firms may indeed suffer from liability of foreignness. This is consistent 
with the observation that the foreign ownership dummy has a positive impact on 
inefficiency. To recapitulate, we already have a proxy for foreign technology in the 
production function. Hence, the foreign ownership dummy variable in the inefficiency 
equation captures non-technology factors such as cultural distance. 
 MNE subsidiaries in developing countries benefit significantly by providing training to 
their work force. Note that training in general does not reduce inefficiency. Indeed, in 
column 5, the training dummy variable has a positive coefficient, indicating that training 
provided by domestic firms may actually increase inefficiency. However, training 
provided by MNE subsidiaries not only reduces inefficiencies, it also has a much greater 
impact on (in)efficiency than the years of schooling of the work force. 
 Labour market institutions that facilitate provision of significant social security benefits 
reduces inefficiency. The labour market index with the negative and significant 
coefficient (column 6) captures the extent of protection provided to employees against old 
age, death and disability, sickness and healthcare coverage, and unemployment benefits. 
It is well understood that these benefits can both increase a labourer’s reservation wage 
and can enable her to remain productive by providing protection against malnutrition and 
sickness, and by facilitating search and thereby enhancing x-efficiency. This is consistent 
with available evidence about the impact of safety nets in the labour market on firm level 
(in)efficiency (Bhaumik and Dimova, 2011). 
 In Table 3, we report the estimates of the production function and inefficiency equations for 
only MNEs. Restricting the sample to only MNE subsidiaries results in none of the industries having 
adequate number of observations for estimation of industry-specific production functions. We, 
therefore, estimate a single production function with cross-industry data, with controls for 2-digit 
industries. Further, since our results reported in Tables 1 and 2 are robust across functional form of 
the production function, we have used only the Cobb-Douglas functional form for this exercise. We 
recognise the importance of estimating production functions for individual industries. But the small 
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samples for individual industries have also forced us to pool together MNEs from across 27 
industries. We estimate a single production function for this cross-industry sample, with dummy 
variable controls for individual industries. While this is not ideal, and is an outcome of data limitation, 
we feel that our results highlight some interesting aspects of MNE investment in developing countries. 
The results indicate the following: 
 MNE subsidiaries in developing countries can reduce inefficiency significantly by 
providing training to their work force. This is consistent with the results reported in 
Tables 1 and 2, discussed above. 
 Inefficiency of MNE subsidiaries decreases with the proportion of workers with higher 
education. This contrasts with the results reported in Tables 1 and 2, and suggests that 
MNEs possibly have mechanisms to identify and cherry pick workers whose years of 
education accurately reflect their quality of education and skill levels.  
 Our results have interesting implications for education policies and impact of FDI on human 
capital development in developing countries. They suggest that, in general, years of education, which 
is a stylised metric for evaluating success of education policies in these countries, may not accurately 
reflect quality of education and skills of the labour force. If so, as argued earlier, MNEs would have to 
train their work force anyhow, such that the link between perceived human capital of the work force 
and inward FDI flow is weakened considerably. There is some evidence to suggest that MNEs can 
and do cherry pick those workers whose years of education accurately reflects their quality of 
education and skills. However, the magnitude of the marginal impact of formal education of workers 
on (in)efficiency is much less than the magnitude of the marginal impact of training, i.e., training still 
matters much more than the formal education of the workers. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The stylised literature has concluded that increase in human capital stock is essential for attracting 
FDI. The policy implication of this line of argument is that developing country that aims to attract 
FDI should invest in education. An implicit assumption is that the observable educational levels of 
workers accurately reflect the human capital stock of the workers. However, in most (if not all) 
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developing countries, formal educational levels are a noisy signal for human capital, a fact that is 
often overlooked in the discussion about the linkage between human capital of workers and FDI. It is 
easy to argue that under such circumstances efficiency and productivity of MNE subsidiaries are more 
likely to depend on firm-specific training of workers than on their formal educational levels. In this 
paper, using cross-country firm-level data for the textiles industry, we test this hypothesis. 
 Our results suggest that, at least for industries in which developing countries have 
comparative advantage, and yet where there is limited technical progress, this is indeed the case: 
training reduces inefficiency significantly but formal education level of workers does not have a 
significant impact of this inefficiency. The impact of training is even greater for MNE subsidiaries. 
Our analysis involving a cross-industry analysis of only MNE subsidiaries indicate that observable 
human capital of workers may reduce firm-level inefficiency, suggesting that there may be merit to 
the popular perception that MNEs are able to cherry pick high quality labourers. Importantly, 
however, even within a sample of MNE subsidiaries, training has far greater impact on firm-level 
(in)efficiency than formal education level of workers. 
 Our results bring into question the popular wisdom that significant investment in education is 
necessary to attract human capital. While this may be true for high technology sectors such as ICT 
and pharmaceuticals in which only a handful of developing countries like India have a comparative 
advantage, for many other industries in which developing countries have comparative advantage a 
level of education that enables workers to absorb firm-specific training may be sufficient to attract 
FDI. In other words, educational policy that aims to widen the coverage of primary and secondary 
education might be optimal for early stages of industrialisation that is generally based on low 
technology industries.  
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Table 1 
Determinants of inefficiency in a Cobb-Douglas production function 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Production function 
(Log) materials   0.47 *** 
  (0.26) 
  0.43 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.42 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.40 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.38 *** 
  (0.02) 
(Log) labour   0.27 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.27 *** 
  (0.03) 
  0.26 *** 
  (0.03) 
  0.25 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.32 *** 
  (0.03) 
(Log) capital   0.31 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.33 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.33 
  (0.02) 
  0.37 *** 
  (0.02) 
  0.37 *** 
  (0.02) 
Access to foreign technology 
(dummy) 
  0.10 
  (0.08) 
  0.18 * 
  (0.09) 
  0.16 * 
  (0.09) 
  0.29 *** 
  (0.09) 
  0.25 *** 
  (0.09) 
Constant   1.24 *** 
  (0.09) 
  0.99 *** 
  (0.09) 
  1.01 *** 
  (0.08) 
  1.24 *** 
  (0.09) 
  1.04 *** 
  (0.09) 
Inefficiency equation 
Proportion of employees with less 
than 6 years education 
   0.08 ** 
  (0.04) 
  0.12 *** 
  (0.05) 
  0.002 
  (0.004) 
- 0.0003 
  (0.005) 
Proportion of employees with more 
than 12 years education 
   0.10 *** 
  (0.04) 
  0.14 *** 
  (0.04) 
  0.02 *** 
  (0.003) 
  0.01 *** 
  (0.003) 
Foreign ownership (dummy)   - 30.71 
  (1142.74) 
  4.60 *** 
  (1.13) 
  3.18 *** 
  (1.06) 
Training (dummy)      0.50 ** 
  (0.25) 
  0.02 
  (0.27) 
Foreign ownership × Training    - 2.04 *** 
  (0.75) 
- 1.51 ** 
  (0.66) 
Index for employment flexibility       1.53 
  (4.05) 
Index for social security benefits     - 4.65 *** 
  (1.57) 
Index for collective bargaining       4.68 
  (5.83) 
Constant  - 10.41 *** 
  (3.82) 
- 14.42 *** 
  (4.67) 
- 2.61 *** 
  (0.53) 
- 2.77 
  (4.89) 
      
Log likelihood - 1260.90 - 940.91 - 937.30 - 811.73 - 790.77 
Wald chi-square 
Prob > |chi-square| 
  7623.42 
  (0.00) 
  5491.47 
  (0.00) 
  5536.37 
  (0.00) 
  5958.99 
  (0.00) 
  5758.40 
  (0.00) 
Number of observations   1060   804   804   768   768 
Note:  Values within parentheses are standard errors. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Determinants of inefficiency in a translog production function 
 
 (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) 
Production function 
Translog functional form   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Inefficiency equation 
Proportion of employees with less 
than 6 years education 
- 0.006 
  (0.005) 
- 0.005 
  (0.005) 
- 0.0004 
  (0.003) 
- 0.004 
  (0.004) 
Proportion of employees with more 
than 12 years education 
  0.02 *** 
  (0.003) 
  0.02 *** 
  (0.003) 
  0.02 *** 
  (0.003) 
  0.01 *** 
  (0.003) 
Foreign ownership (dummy)    1.23 *** 
  (0.31) 
  4.64 *** 
  (0.93) 
  2.70 *** 
  (0.93) 
Training (dummy)     0.51 *** 
  (0.17) 
- 0.17 
  (0.42) 
Foreign ownership × Training   - 2.29 *** 
  (0.62) 
- 1.61 *** 
  (0.58) 
Index for employment flexibility      1.36 
  (3.30) 
Index for social security benefits    - 6.04 *** 
  (1.36) 
Index for collective bargaining      5.99 
  (4.80) 
Constant - 1.36 *** 
  (0.29) 
- 1.42 *** 
  (0.24) 
- 1.98*** 
  (0.35) 
- 1.86 
  (3.98) 
     
Log likelihood - 892.22 - 886.20 - 731.57 - 679.80 
Wald chi-square 
Prob > |chi-square| 
  6413.01 
  (0.00) 
  6603.14 
  (0.00) 
  8250.41 
  (0.00) 
  8602.05 
  (0.00) 
Number of observations   804   804   768   768 
Note:  Values within parentheses are standard errors. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Determinants of inefficiency in multinational enterprises 
 
 (1) (2) 
Production function 
(Log) materials   0.44 *** 
  (0.03) 
  0.43 *** 
  (0.03) 
(Log) labour   0.32 *** 
  (0.05) 
  0.33 *** 
  (0.04) 
(Log) capital   0.29 
  (0.04) 
  0.29 *** 
  (0.03) 
Constant   0.94 
  (0.30) 
  0.95 *** 
  (0.29) 
Industry controls   Yes ***   Yes *** 
Inefficiency equation 
Proportion of employees with less 
than 6 years education 
- 1.56 
  (1.82) 
- 3.36 
  (7.24) 
Proportion of employees with more 
than 12 years education 
- 0.74 *** 
  (0.28) 
- 0.31 * 
  (0.17) 
Training (dummy) - 4.90 *** 
  (1.79) 
- 4.17 *** 
  (1.44) 
Index for employment flexibility  - 142.86 
  (6724.60) 
Index for social security benefits  - 138.99 
  (8092.14) 
Index for collective bargaining  - 131.41 
  (10312.88) 
Constant   8.60 *** 
  (1.79) 
  180.83 
  (3053.39) 
   
Log likelihood - 237.66 - 225.13 
Wald chi-square 
Prob > |chi-square| 
  1119.45 
  (0.00) 
  1190.33 
  (0.00) 
Number of observations   221   221 
Note:  Values within parentheses are standard errors. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
